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In this paper we incorporate monitoring and enforcement aspects in the choice of environmental policy
instruments in a general equilibrium framework. Goulder et al. (J.Pub.Econ., 1999) look into the
choice of policy instruments in the presence of distortionary taxes. We extend this model by no longer
assuming full compliance from firms. A violating firm is caught with a certain probability by the
inspection agency. Once a violator is detected, he always has to pay a fine. With a positive, finite
expected fine and a probability of detection smaller than unity, there will always be a certain
proportion of noncompliance in the economy. We calculate the gross efficiency costs of different
policy instruments (emission tax, output tax, tradable permits and technology mandate). We illustrate
the model for different price instruments (emission tax, output tax and tradable permits). We find that
the relative inefficiency of grandfathered tradable permits vis-à-vis emission taxes found in a second-
best setting with perfect compliance, is strongly decreased with imperfect compliance.
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 1. Introduction
When creating an environmental policy the regulator faces many choices. The most important one is
probably the selection of the appropriate policy instrument. Many criteria are relevant for this choice.
In the literature
2 one finds economic criteria (e.g. economic efficiency, cost-effectiveness
3 or
distribution), environmental criteria (e.g. threshold safety levels, dose-response relationships or
irreversibilities), technological criteria
4 (feasibility or incentives for innovation) and political criteria
5
(equity, precaution, acceptability and simplicity). Here we focus on economic efficiency and analyse
the integration of monitoring and enforcement in traditional economic models for the selection of
policy instruments.
In recent years, attention has been paid to the interaction of the environmental policy with
distortionary taxes, such as labour taxes. It turns out that environmental taxes can increase the
inefficiency of existing labour taxes. In fact it is shown that reducing pollution, no matter how, has
mostly a hidden cost when there are existing tax distortions
6. Goulder, Parry and Burtraw (1997) have
used analytical and numerical general equilibrium models to explore the choice between pollution
taxes and quotas in the presence of distortionary labour taxes.
This paper extends the work of Goulder et al. (1999). They use a general equilibrium model to
examine the costs of achieving pollution reductions under a range of environmental policy instruments
in a second-best setting with pre-existing labour taxes. They compare the costs and overall efficiency
impact of emission taxes, emission quota, fuel taxes and mandated technologies. These efficiency
costs are decomposed into four terms: the abatement effect, the output substitution effect, the revenue-
recycling effect and the tax interaction effect. All these models use the assumption of perfect and
costless monitoring and enforcement of the different environmental policies. This assumption is not
unimportant. Although rigorous analyses of inspection and enforcement problems are rare,
enforcement problems are often quoted as one of the major decision criteria in the choice of
instruments. Enforcement problems may require important public budgets and may limit the
environmental effectiveness of certain policy lines.
Monitoring and enforcement issues have been studied in the literature in a detailed way but mostly
instrument by instrument. The goal of this paper is not to optimise the enforcement strategy for each
instrument but rather to compare instruments given imperfect compliance. This will require strong
simplifications on the behaviour of polluting firms and that of the inspection agency.
In this paper we choose to deter firms by the threat of high expected penalties. One of the first
questions to ask is why firms would attempt to comply with regulations. At first sight they gain
nothing by complying, on the contrary they face higher costs. However, several motivations for
compliance can be found in the literature (e.g. Cohen – 2000). Firms can be deterred if they face high
                                                       
2 See, for example, Bohm and Russell (1985).
3 See, for example, Atkinson and Tietenberg (1991); Parry (1997).
4 See, for example, Jaffe and Stavins (1995); Milliman and Prince (1989).
5 See, for example, Hahn (1990).
6 See, for example, Goulder (1995), Bovenberg and de Mooij (1994) and Parry (1995).3
expected penalties (e.g. Becker – 1968). State dependent enforcement (e.g. Harrington – 1988,
Harford – 1991, Harford and Harrington – 1991) can also induce firms to comply with environmental
policy. In these papers firms are placed in a certain group depending on their past compliance
behaviour. Firms who violated the law in the previous period face a higher probability of inspection
than compliant firms do. In a recent paper Heyes and Rickman (1999) consider regulatory dealing as a
possible cause of the compliance behaviour by firms. Another plausible explanation is that firm
managers are led by social norms and accordingly adjust their behaviour (e.g. Arora and
Gangopadhyay – 1995, Rauscher – 1997). Another way to obtain greater compliance is by
incorporating self-reporting (e.g. Kaplow – 1995, Livernois and McKenna – 1999, Heyes – 1996).
There is some controversy in the literature concerning the objective function of the inspection agency.
Some authors assume that the agency maximises environmental quality; e.g. Farber and Martin (1986).
It is also possible that the inspection agency maximises social welfare; e.g. Polinsky and Shavell
(1992). If this is the case the governmental and the agency’s choice problems can be aggregated since
they share the same objective function. This is the approach we will follow. Another option for the
inspection agency is to maximise compliance or minimise violations; e.g. Garvie and Keeler (1994).
Finally we also like to mention the minimisation of the enforcement costs as a regulatory objective;
e.g. Storey and McCabe (1980), Malik (1992). Which objective function to choose is a matter of
individual preference. Keeler (1995) compares the consequences of different objective functions. He
concludes that greater weight given to compliance costs relative to the social damages of the polluting
activity will bring outcomes closer to the optimum when the regulator is strong, but may move the
outcome further from the social optimum when regulatory powers are weak.
A noncompliant firm will be detected with a certain probability. We assume that an inspection team
can perfectly detect the actual level of emissions. Consequently all violators are caught if they are
inspected
7. We will assume one particularly easy form for the probability of detection: it is
proportional to the percentage underreporting. However, these inspections are not for free. We assume
that inspection costs are financed by the government budget.
Once the violator has been caught, the firm has to pay a fine, consisting of the overdue taxes and a
penalty payment.
In section 2 monitoring and enforcement issues are integrated into the Goulder et al. model. In section
3 we compare the gross efficiency costs of marginal policy changes with an analytical model. In
section 4 we describe the numerical model. This model is used to calculate the relative cost efficiency
of different policy instruments for several levels of emission reduction in section 5. In section 6 we
discuss the role of the fine and the inspection costs extensions and in section 7 we conclude.
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2. The model
The model we use is based on the model of Goulder et al. (1999). We discuss the representation of
household behaviour, firms and government.
Households
It is a static, general equilibrium model where a representative household derives utility from the
consumption of a polluting good (X), a clean good (Y); and from leisure. Leisure is equal to the
household time endowment (T) less labour supply (L). The emissions (E) resulting from the
production of X cause environmental damage and therefore lead to a decrease in consumer utility. The
household utility function is:
( ) ( ) ,, UuXYTLE f =-- (1)
where u(.) is a quasi-concave utility function for non-environmental goods. It is assumed that X and Y
are equally good substitutes for labour.  The function  (.) f  is the disutility from waste emissions. It is
weakly convex. The separability restriction in (1) implies that demand for X and Y and supply of
labour do not vary with changes in E
8. Therefore we can leave the the improvement in environmental
quality out of the picture. In this paper we discuss the gross efficiency costs of decreasing emissions
by a given level. We will only focus on efficiency considerations and will ignore distributional
aspects.
The household budget constraint is:
G L t Y X p L X + - = + ) 1 (  + p (2)
where  X p  is the demand price of X. This price is equal to unity in the absence of regulation. The price
of the non-polluting good  Y p  is constant, equal to unity and not affected by the environmental policy.
The non-polluting good Y is the numeraire in the theoretical model. In the numerical model we will
use labour as the numeraire. The firms’ profits p are redistributed to the households.
The households choose X, Y and L in order to maximise utility (1) subject to the budget constraint (2),
taking environmental damages as given. From the resulting first-order conditions the uncompensated
demand and labour supply functions are obtained:
) , 1 , ( and ) , 1 , ( ), , 1 , ( p p p + - + - + - G t p L G t p Y G t p X L X L X L X (3)
Substituting these equations into (1) gives the indirect utility function:
) ( ) , 1 , ( E G t p v V L X f p - + - = (4)
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Firms
Competitive firms use labour, which is the only factor of production, to produce the goods X and Y.
The marginal product of labour is assumed to be constant in each industry. Further output is
normalised such that marginal products and wage rate equal unity.
Firms can reduce their waste emissions per unit of output by using abatement equipment or purchasing
abatement services. It is assumed that such equipment or services are produced directly from labour.
Emissions per unit of X are equal to eo-a, where eo represents baseline emissions per unit of output (or
emissions per unit without regulation) and a is the reduction in per-unit emissions due to abatement.
Economy-wide emissions, E, are therefore equal to (eo-a)X. Thus, total emissions fall as a result of
reduced production of X (the output-substitution effect) and increased abatement activity (the
abatement effect). In the numerical model we will incorporate a third way of emission reduction,
namely via input-substitution. This means that firms will have the option to change their input mix and
use less of the most polluting input.
The total cost C of abatement to the firm is given by:
C = c(a).X (5)
where c(a) is a convex function representing the per-unit cost of abatement activity.
In order to incorporate monitoring and enforcement we need some additional assumptions.
As explained in the introduction we assume that firms will attempt to comply with the environmental
regulation because of the threat of high expected penalties. Furthermore we also assume that firms can
be noncompliant in a continuous way. They can choose any possible level of actual emissions. When
we consider an emission tax ( E t ), firms have to report their emissions (Zj) to the government. It is
obvious that reported emissions will never exceed actual emissions if firms behave rationally. The
regulator, however, anticipates that firms are inclined to cheat and will therefore pursue a monitoring
and enforcement policy in order to deter them.
The noncompliant firm will be detected with a certain probability, the probability of detection pdet. We
assume that the equipment of an inspection team perfectly measures the actual level of emissions.
Consequently all violators are caught if they are inspected. We will assume that the probability of
detection is proportional to the underreporting
9. Inspections are costly. Firstly we have fixed
inspection costs (FIX), e.g. infrastructure. The level of these costs does not depend on the number of
inspections performed, only on the type of policy instrument used. Further we also assume that there
are variable inspection costs (v), e.g. sample testing or fuel. These costs are incurred every time an
inspection is performed. All these costs are financed by the government budget.
                                                       
9 The inspection agency will inspect firms with a higher level of violation with a higher probability. We assume that the
greater the crime the more visible it is for the inspection agency. This higher visibility can be the result of complaints by
neighbours and interest groups or it can result from higher nuisance. The agency does not take any other attributes of firms
into account.6
Once the violator is caught, the firm has to pay the overdue taxes plus a penalty (r) payment that is
proportional to the evaded taxes. This total payment is called the fine (f) and is equal to
( ) ( ) 1 E feztr =-+.
The behaviour of the firms
Let us consider a revenue-neutral tax  E t on the emissions in the industry. The profit for the firm per
unit of X is:
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z = reported emissions per unit of output
r = interest payments on overdue taxes
and, since we work in competitive markets, profits are zero in equilibrium .
Note that for pdet = 0 or f = 0, we get a corner solution and the reported emissions will equal zero.
Since violators are not punished for lying about their emissions, they maximise their profits by
reporting no emissions and therefore paying no taxes.
In table 2 we investigate the influence of the emission tax  E t  and the penalty
11 r on the optimal
behaviour of firms. More specifically we look at changes in abatement a* and reported emissions z*.
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Table 1: Reaction of firms to changes in the emission tax and the penalty
                                                       






= . This is plausible since inspections often follow complaints by citizens or other administrations and these
complaints are more probable if violations are more serious.
11 Please keep in mind that the penalty r is not equivalent to the fine f.7
Firstly we consider the case were the emission tax is zero. Firms will not invest in abatement nor will
they report any emissions. Therefore we will focus on a strictly positive emission tax from now on.
Secondly for r = 0 the interest payments are zero but there is still a punishment for violating firms
because they have to pay their overdue taxes. The reported emissions will not be zero because the
reported emissions influence the probability of detection. The total amount paid, taxes on reported
emissions plus overdue taxes, is minimised by reporting half of the actual emissions.
Thirdly when the penalty r goes to infinity, the firms will be reporting more and more truthfully.
Moreover, the marginal abatement cost will, in the limit, equal the emission tax rate.
Finally we consider the case in which both the emission tax and the penalty are positive and finite. The
firms will never report zero emissions because then the firm would always have to pay the complete
tax plus the fine. It could always do better by reporting truthfully because then it would not have to
pay the fine. We are now left with two cases: one is the corner solution of reporting truthfully and one
leads to an internal solution. Reporting truthfully (case A) will only be optimal when the following
expression is satisfied:
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We have evaluated this expression for a linear abatement cost function and it never holds. For
different specifications of the abatement function, e.g. a quadratic function, the situation will probably
differ. However we choose to ignore this case. We will focus in this paper on the existence of an
interior solution (Case B).
In order to obtain an expression for the reported emissions per unit output (z), we differentiate
equation (6) with respect to z. This gives:
( ) ( ) 0 , det 0 0 2 2
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Firms choose a, the level of abatement per unit, in order to maximise profits (differentiate (10) with
respect to a). The first-order conditions are:















For each firm abatement activity occurs until the marginal abatement cost per unit of X equals the
effective emission tax rate.8
The government levies a proportional tax of  L t on labour earnings, regulates emissions and provides a
fixed nominal lump-sum transfer G to the households. The government budget is assumed to be
balanced. Adjusting the labour tax  L t
12 offsets any revenue consequences from environmental
policies. In the numerical model we will assume that rent income is taxed at the same rate as labour
income.
Government
The expression for the government budget is:
detdet ... . EL ZLfXGFIXvp ttpn =++ ++   (12)
where n represents the number of firms, v is the variable inspection cost and FIX represents the fixed
cost of the inspection. In principle inspection cost functions can differ for each environmental policy
instrument.
3. The gross efficiency cost of different environmental instruments
Goulder et al. focus on the gross efficiency cost of alternative environmental policies. This cost is the
monetary equivalent of the loss in utility. It is a gross concept in that it does not include the




















This is the (partial equilibrium) efficiency cost from raising an additional dollar of labour tax
revenue
13. The numerator is the efficiency loss from an incremental increase in  L t . This equals the
wedge between the gross wage (equal to the value of the marginal product of labour) and the net wage
(equal to the marginal social cost of labour in terms of foregone leisure), multiplied by the reduction in
labour supply. The denominator is the marginal labour tax revenue (from differentiating  L t L).
We now analyse the gross efficiency cost of various environmental policies for the case with imperfect
compliance and have Goulder et al. results as a special case.
                                                       
12 In a one-consumer setting, the optimal tax structure is to use only the lump-sum tax G and to have  L t = 0 or to use a profit
tax in the presence of pure profit. In this case the Goulder et al. problem becomes trivial because we can return to a first-best
if Pigouvian taxes can be used (Mayeres and Proost (1997)). However, this simple framework will allow us to better isolate
the effects of the environmental policy.
13 It equals the marginal cost of public funds minus one.9
The gross cost of emission taxes
Next we consider an incremental, revenue-neutral increase in  E t . The effect on the product price of




















Revenues from the emission tax will be employed to finance cuts in the distortionary tax,  L t . We now
derive an expression for the change in labour tax necessary to maintain government budget balance
following the increase in emission tax.









































































































































































We are interested in the gross effect of the tax increase  E t  on welfare. Differentiating utility (4) with
respect to  E t , using Roy’s identity and (14), and ignoring the terms in f


































This is the efficiency cost (ignoring environmental benefits) from an incremental increase in  E t ,
expressed in monetary terms.
                                                       
14 The monitoring and enforcement expenditures are constant due to the specific functional forms we chose.
15 Remember that we look for the gross efficiency costs and therefore do not take the environmental effects of a policy into
account.10
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Substituting (21) in (20), using (14), gives us:
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(22)
     revenue-recycling             tax interaction

















As in Goulder et al. we find that the gross cost of an increase in the emission tax recycled via a
decrease in labour taxes can be decomposed into four effects. The reduction in emissions is achieved
via a combination of two effects: the reduction of emissions per unit of output (abatement effect) and
the substitution away from the consumption of X (output-substitution effect). The costs caused by
these two effects are called the primary costs. In a first-best setting, the relative cost-effectiveness of
different policies can be explained fully in terms of differences in primary costs.
In a second-best setting, with distortionary taxes, two additional cost terms come into play. The first
term is the efficiency gain from the (marginal) revenue-recycling effect. This is the product of the
marginal excess burden of taxation and the marginal revenues (if any) from the policy. It represents
efficiency gains associated with using these revenues to finance cuts in distortionary taxes.
The second extra term is the efficiency loss from the tax interaction effect. This effect has two
components. First, the new policy can increase the price of X, implying an increase in the cost of
consumption and thus a reduction in the real wage. This reduces labour supply and produces a
marginal efficiency loss that equals the tax wedge between the gross and the net wage multiplied by
the reduction in labour supply. In addition, the reduction in labour supply contributes to a reduction in
tax revenues, which has an efficiency cost of M times the lost tax revenues, equal to the change in
labour supply times the labour tax rate.
16
                                                       
16 Here we rule out complementarity between leisure and X.11
We see that incorporating monitoring and enforcement in the model, leads to a decrease of the











This last factor depends on the penalty rate on overdue taxes. The effective tax rate is lower than the
nominal one in a model with monitoring and enforcement because some firms can get away with only
paying taxes on their reported emissions and not their actual emissions. Since the effective tax rate is
lower in the model with monitoring and enforcement than in the model without, all the different
efficiency effects will also be lower. Therefore we can say that the gross efficiency cost of a marginal
increase in the nominal emission tax is lower in the model with monitoring and enforcement.
Moreover the monitoring and enforcement costs do not differ at the margin.
However, all this does not mean that utility is higher for the model with partial compliance. Remember
that we did not take the environmental effects of the policy into account. It is obvious that the
environmental quality is worse for a particular tax rate in the partial compliance case. In order to reach
the same environmental emission reduction as with full compliance, one needs a comparatively higher
emission tax rate.
Compared to the Goulder et al. case, we obtain the same four effects all deflated with the same







. When r approaches infinity, there is full compliance and this factor
disappears.
The gross efficiency cost of tradable permits
The derivations for the remaining instruments provide new insights.
It is assumed that a firm receives a certain number of permits from the government. It is possible to
obtain more permits by trading among firms. Firms state the number (pr) of emission permits they
own. If their actual emissions are fully covered by the permits a firm is in compliance. If the actual
emissions exceed the number accounted for by the permits, the violator risks to be detected with a














det  and then they have to pay a fine equal to
) 1 ( ) ( 0 r pr a e f
v
E t + - = - . The virtual tax can be interpreted as the price at which the permits are
traded in the market
17.
For a tradable permit system, we analyse the gross tax of an emission permit reduction via an increase
in the virtual tax 
v
E t :
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                 revenue-recycling                     tax interaction effect
Compared to the emission tax case, we have the same abatement, output-substitution and tax-
interaction effect. The revenue-recycling effect, however, will be much smaller. This is in contrast
with Goulder et al. results where, because of the full compliance assumption, there is no revenue-
recycling effect for tradable permits. We will see later in the numerical results that this reduces the
disadvantage of tradable permits in second-best worlds.
The gross cost of a fuel tax
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                         tax interaction effect







. The fine and the probability of detection depend on the difference between reported (Xr) and
actual production (X).
The gross cost of a technology mandate
For the calculation of the gross efficiency cost of an incremental increase in a technology mandate a
we work with slightly different assumptions. When we consider the expression of the firm's expected
penalty, we get:
  ( ) ) 1 ( . . det det r a a p f p + - = (26)
We now assume that the probability of detection is fixed and independent of the true emissions. When
a violator is caught, he has to pay a certain sum of money depending on the amount of abatement he
failed to install.
For a revenue-neutral increase in the technology mandate, the gross efficiency cost is now equal to:13
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revenue recycling tax interaction
This can interpreted in the same way as before. We see that every term is multiplied by the same term
pdet(1+r). Moreover we also find an output substitution and a revenue recycling effect. This is due to
the existence of fine payments to the government.
4. Numerical model
Description of the model
We use the same model and data as Goulder et al.. It is a general equilibrium model for the American
economy, calibrated tot the 1990 situation. The environmental pollution problem addressed is the air
pollutant NOX.
We now incorporate intermediate inputs in the production model. This yields a new channel for
emission reduction: the input-substitution effect. Emissions can be reduced not only by abatement and
output-substitution but also by input-substitution. This means that the firms can alter the mix of
intermediate inputs and use less of the polluting input.
    Figure 1: The production of the different commodities
We distinguish two different intermediate goods: a polluting (D) and a clean (N) intermediate good. In
our application the polluting good can be thought of as being energy. There are two final consumption
goods: CD represents output from industries that use D more intensively and CN represents output
from industries that use N more intensively. The production relationships between different
commodities are represented in Figure 1.
The structure of the numerical model is directly based on the previously discussed theoretical model.
Household and firm behaviour, as well as governmental policy, are formalised. Labour is our
numeraire. The complete model can be found in the appendix 2.
CD
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where C is composite consumption and defined by:
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The definitions of the variables and parameters can be found in appendix 2. The household maximises
utility with respect to the budget constraint:
  G p t L t p CN p CD p C R L L CN CD + - + - = + ) 1 ( ) 1 ( p (30)
This expression equals household spending with the household revenues.
We now consider the production side of the economy. A CES-form is used for the production
functions in all industries j:



















We assume a constant-returns-to-scale production technology. Labour and rent income are assumed to
be taxed at the same rate
19. We also assume that the marginal abatement costs are linear.
Firms choose profit-maximising production and abatement subject to the constraints imposed by
environmental regulation and taking input and output prices as given. Profits equal the value of output
minus expenditures on inputs, labour and abatement, less any tax and fine payments. This gives the
following expression:
det (). jjjjiijejjj j
i
pXpXZApF ptt =----- ￿ (32)
To obtain a general equilibrium, supply must equal demand for all produced goods, government
revenue must equal government transfer payment, and pollution emissions must equal a specified
target. Since production and abatement functions are linearly homogeneous, the supply of each good is
perfectly elastic at given factor prices and tax rates. Under these conditions we can reduce the set of
equilibrium conditions to three equations:
                                                       
18 Further reading on CES functions can be found in Keller (1976).
19 In the numerical exercise both tax rates are reduced if we have extra revenue from the environmental policy. It would also
be possible to adapt only the labour tax rate. This would not change the results for the instruments with zero profit for the
firms. For the other instruments we expect some small changes.15
aggregate labour demand equals aggregate supply: ￿ + =
j
j L A AD L ,
government revenue equals expenditures:  ￿ + + =
j
j C p v FIX G p REV det .
and pollution levels equal the target level: Etotmax reduc Etot ) 1 ( - =
20.
Data
In Table 2 we summarise the benchmark data set of Goulder et al. (1998), which represents the United
States economy in 1990. Production data were obtained from the Commerce Department Bureau of
Economic Analysis.
D N CD CN Leisure time Total output
value
D 91 441.0 111 842.7 156 881.1 6 264.4 366 429.2
N 88 073.5 4 741 097.5 464 159.9 2 670 485.6 7 963 816.5
Labour 186 914.7 3 110 876.3 1 832 106.1 5 129 897.1




Table 2: Input-output flows (in millions of 1990 dollars per year except when otherwise noted)
Source: Goulder et al. (1998)
The polluting intermediate good D comprises fossil fuels
21, while the clean intermediate good N
includes all other intermediates. The final good CD is a composite of the consumer goods whose
production involves intensive use of fossil fuels (consumer utilities, motor vehicles and gasoline),
while the good CN embraces all other final goods.
The parameter values used in the model can be found in the appendix 2. The distribution parameters a
for production and utility functions were calibrated in GAMS based on the assumed elasticities of
substitution and the restriction that the benchmark data must be replicated in the absence of a new
environmental policy.
Although we try to derive general relationships, we must commit to certain parameter values in
running the model. The central case values for pollution-related parameters are based on
characteristics of NOx emissions (Pechan – 1996). Pollution takes place every time a unit of D is used
in the production process.
                                                       
20 In the GAMS model we only use the government budget and emission target conditions. By Walras’ law, if these two
conditions are satisfied, the third condition must also hold. We have used this third condition, labour market clearance, as a
check on the optimality of the obtained solution.
21 Fossil fuels include oil, coal and natural gas.16
In de numerical model we arbitrarily choose the values of the monitoring and enforcement costs. This
exercise is illustrative of the changes that occur in a model when these costs are incorporated.
Accurate data on these costs are very hard to find.
Instruments
We consider three different environmental instruments: an emission tax, a fuel tax and tradable
permits. We limit ourselves to price instruments
22 in the numerical model.
1. Emission tax
We will determine one emission tax rate  e t for all industries. Since in equilibrium the marginal
abatement costs will be the same across industries, this assumption is imposed in the model. This is
done via the first-order condition of the profit maximisation problem of firms. Firms will initially pay
taxes on reported emissions. With a certain probability of detection, depending on the level of the
violation, firms are caught. Then violators have to pay the overdue taxes increased with interest
payments.
2. Fuel tax
The fuel tax is a tax  D t  on the output of sector D; D being the polluting intermediate good. Firms will
never use abatement to reduce their emissions because the fuel tax is levied on the amount of output of
sector D and this is independent of the abatement expenditures by firms. This implies that marginal
abatement costs in the different industries will equal zero. Firms will initially pay taxes on reported
output. With a certain probability of detection, depending on the level of the violation, firms are
caught. Then violators have to pay the overdue taxes increased with penalty payments.
3. Tradable permits
As mentioned before, we only discuss grandfathered tradable permits. In the model we look at the
situation after trade has occurred. We assume that there are no transaction costs in the trading market.
The model then determines the level of permits (or emissions
23) per sector for which the marginal
abatement costs are equal. Firms will initially claim that the emissions produced equal the number of
permits owned. However, this is not necessarily true. With a certain probability of detection,
depending on the level of the violation, firms are caught lying. Violators then have to buy extra
permits and have to pay a certain fine, again depending on the size of the violation.
                                                       
22 However we are currently extending the model to quantity instruments, such as technology mandates, performance
standards and emission standards.
23 We assumed that one permit allows a firm to produce one unit (=kg) of emissions.17
5. Comparing the gross cost of different policy instruments
We will first determine the impact of a policy. Using initial prices we define the welfare gain as that
sum of money which the households would have accepted in the initial position as equivalent to the
impact of the reform, and we call this the equivalent gain (King – 1983). It is defined by
24:
( ) ( )
R R N R U p E U p E gain equivalent EG , , - = = (33)
In the reference situation we assume that there are no emission reductions and no environmental
policy. The elements of the reference price vector p
R are all assumed to be equal to unity. Therefore






N R = , , as follows
25: 
R N U U EG - = . (34)
In each new scenario we impose a certain level of emission reduction, e.g. 10 percent. For every
policy instrument we then determine the optimal size so that the required emission reduction is
achieved. With each scenario a new utility level is associated. It is obvious that after the introduction
of the environmental regulation utility will have been reduced. This holds because we ignore any
utility effect of improved environmental quality (i.e. leaving out the benefit of the policy, which gives
us the gross cost, rather than the net welfare change). Therefore we will often speak of  “equivalent
loss” rather than “equivalent gain”.
To facilitate comparisons across instruments we take the emission tax as a reference point. We will
compare the equivalent loss of the instruments with that of the emission tax in each scenario.
Remember that we consider qualitative, rather than quantitative differences across policies.
First-best setting: gross costs with and without perfect compliance
We first consider the equivalent gain in a first-best setting
26 ( L t =0). Now only the primary costs will
apply. The losses (or costs) under the different policy instruments are shown in Figure 2. The
differences across policies are expressed as the ratio of total losses of the policy in question to total
costs under the emission tax. Consequently the curve for the emission tax is constant at unity.
The curve for the tradable permits is equal to unity and therefore coincides with the curve for the
emission tax. This means that, under a first-best setting, grandfathered tradable permits are just as
efficient as an emission tax. This holds because the tax interaction and revenue-recycling effects do
not prevail in the absence of distortionary taxes and thus the source of the cost differences, the
revenue-recycling effect, is absent.
                                                       
24 with E(.) = expenditure function,  R = the reference value and N = the new value
25 This holds only for the specific functional forms we use in our model.
26 Any government revenues are returned in a lump-sum fashion to the households.18
Next we consider the fuel tax. Its first-best cost exceeds that of the emission tax because the abatement
effect is absent. Firms will not reduce emissions by installing abatement equipment because it does not
help them to comply with the policy and it is costly.
Figure 2: The cost ratio of first-best policy alternatives to the cost of a first-best emission tax
We now compare these results with the results obtained in a model without monitoring and
enforcement (see Figure 3).
Figure 3: The cost ratio of first-best policy alternatives to the cost of a first-best emission tax without
monitoring and enforcement
Comparing the two figures, one can see that in a first-best setting the introduction of a monitoring and
enforcement policy does not greatly alter the relative position of the different environmental policy
instruments. Just note that, under full-compliance, the relative cost difference between the fuel tax and
the emission tax is larger (smaller) for small (high) emission reductions than in the model with
imperfect compliance.
It is also interesting to compare the gross cost of emission reduction with and without perfect
compliance. The gross costs differ because of the total enforcement costs and because of the induced



























































































































We will now take into account the effect of pre-existing distortionary labour taxes ( L t = 0.4). The
resulting cost ratios are represented in Figure 4. Again we have results for three policy instruments:
the emission tax, the fuel tax and tradable permits. We compare the case with and without perfect
compliance.
Figure 4: The cost ratio of second-best policy alternatives to the cost of first-best emission tax.
Figure 5: The cost ratio of second-best policy alternatives to the cost of the first-best emission tax in the
full compliance case.
We concentrate first on the cost curves for imperfect compliance in a second-best world shown in
figure 4. They are all expressed relative to the cost of using emission taxes in a first-best world. We
notice two important effects of bringing in imperfect compliance. First when we examine the cost of20
using emission taxes, the cost increase due to the labour market distortion is approximately the same.
Secondly, the gross costs of tradable permits are much higher than the costs of emission taxes in a
second-best world. The disadvantage of tradable permits has, however, been decreased from 288% to
81% due to the revenue recycling effect that now exists for tradable permits too.
Imperfect compliance does not affect the relative disadvantage of fuel taxes compared to emission
taxes.
6. The role of the fine and the inspection costs
In this section we want to give an indication of the sensitivity of the model to changes in the
monitoring and enforcement parameters. The impact of increasing the rent or penalty payment r and
the enforcement costs (v and FIX) on the results in a first-best setting is given in Table 3.
It is impossible to double the actual fine because the level of the fine depends on the level of the
violation. Therefore we consider the impact of a higher penalty payment r on the results. We only look
at the emission tax policy and consider a ten percent reduction of emissions.
Benchmark Rent payment r (x2) Enforcement costs
v and fix (x2)
Emission tax 1.484359 › (1.484376) ﬂ (1.483857)
Reported emissions 13105.110 › (14015.187) =
Actual emissions 24026.035 = =
D 5680.444 ﬂ (5680.440) › (5680.541)
N 7487.511 › (7487.513) ﬂ (7487.463)
CD 10441.599 › (10441.600) ﬂ (10441.551)
CN 416.482 = ﬂ (416.480)
Prob. of detection 0.4545 ﬂ (0.417) =
Fine
27                          D 4215.909 › (4215.957) ﬂ (4214.556)
Government revenues 27557.977 › (27558.304) ﬂ (27548.660)
Utility 2923532 › (2923536) ﬂ (2923434)
Table 3: Sensitivity results for the enforcement parameters for the emission tax (first-best)
As indicated in Table 3 an increase in the penalty r gives the firm an incentive to report a larger
fraction of their actual emissions to the government. Consequently the probability of detection
                                                       
27 We only give the result for the fine of sector D because it is representative for the behaviour of the other sectors.21
decreases
28. The expected fine will therefore also decrease in equilibrium. The government must now
increase the emission tax in order to obtain the same emission reduction. The deterrence effect of the
fines is decreased and must be compensated by an increase in the emission tax. The overall effect is an
improvement of social welfare due to the fact that firm behaviour is closer to the full compliance
behaviour. The government can use the less costly instrument of the emission tax to deter firms
instead of using the costly monitoring and enforcement policy.
When the monitoring and enforcement costs for a give inspection level become more expensive for the
government, then we see that the utility decreases. The emission tax decreases because with a lower
tax the firms are more inclined to comply. The government is therefore able to lower the fine, and the
monitoring and enforcement costs, in order to obtain the same degree of compliance.
Benchmark Rent payment r (x2) Enforcement costs
v and fix (x2)
Emission tax 1.508769 › (1.508804) ﬂ (1.507755)
Reported emissions 11290.923 › (14015.187) =
Actual emissions 20700.025 = =
D 4890.006 ﬂ (4890.000) › (7890.175)
N 6453.003 › (6453.006) ﬂ (6452.919)
CD 8998.113 › (8998.119) ﬂ (8998.034)
CN 358.900 = ﬂ (358.897)
Prob. of detection 0.4545 ﬂ (0.417) =
Fine                            D 3688.945 › (3689.027) ﬂ (3685.593)
Labour tax 0.395867 ﬂ (0.395865) › (0.395928)
Utility 2849895 › (2849900) ﬂ (2849772)
Table 4: Sensitivity results for the enforcement parameters for the emission tax (second best)
In Table 4 we find the results for a second-best setting. In this setting the labour tax rate is variable
since it is assumed that the revenues from the environmental policy are use to reduce the distortionary
tax.
When we look at the impact of an increase in the penalty r, we see that social welfare increases. Just as
in the first-best setting, the emission tax increases. We can apply the same reasoning to the second-
best setting as to the first-best setting. The only difference is the level of the labour tax. Since the
                                                       
28 Remember that the probability of detection is an increasing function of the size of the violation.22
emission tax increases it is logical that the labour tax is decreased. There are more environmental
revenues that can be used to reduce the labour tax distortion.
The doubling of the monitoring and enforcement costs has the same effect in a second-best setting as
in the first-best setting. Social welfare will decrease again. Since the emission tax has decreased, there
are less revenues that can be used to reduced the labour tax. Therefore the labour tax is higher than in
the benchmark model.
Up to now we have worked with monitoring and enforcement costs functions that are identical for the
three instruments considered. One can expect that inspection and enforcement costs will be different
when other types of instruments (such technology standards) are considered. This can have important
effects for the choice of instruments that do not show up in the Goulder et al. (1999) paper.
7. Conclusion
In this paper we have added monitoring and enforcement considerations to the literature on
environmental policies with distortionary taxes. Our model extends the general equilibrium model of
Goulder et al. (1999) to compare the efficiency costs of different policy instruments.
Given the efficiency costs in a full-compliance setting, we can conclude that costs are smaller for all
instruments if we work in a setting with incomplete compliance. The reason for this is that we only
consider a marginal increase of the nominal level of the environmental instrument. However, the
economic agents react to the effective policy level and not the nominal one. In the model with
monitoring and enforcement this effective tax rate is smaller than the nominal one
29. Therefore the
gross efficiency costs of the marginal change in the policy are reduced. However, one should not
forget that not only the efficiency costs decrease but also the marginal benefits of the policy. This
implies that the environmental policy is more expensive in total if we take imperfect compliance into
account.
Imperfect compliance has an important effect on the relative efficiency of tradable emission permits in
a second-best setting. In a perfect compliance, second-best framework, tradable permits have a large
efficiency disadvantage compared to emission taxes. This disadvantage is strongly reduced as tradable
permits now also create public revenue effects and therefore a revenue recycling effect appears. As
there is always some noncompliance, there is always some fine revenue and this is used to reduce the
existing labour market distortions. This term is positive and reduces therefore the efficiency
disadvantage of the tradable permit system found by Goulder et al..
In the numerical model we calculate the relative cost differences for three pricing instruments. We
consider emission taxes, fuel taxes and grandfathered tradable permits. Noteworthy is that the relative
inefficiency of tradable permits vis-à-vis emission taxes in a second-best setting is decreased when we
take the monitoring and enforcement policy into account. This is caused by the presence of the
revenue-recycling effect.
                                                       
29 In the full-compliance model the nominal policy level equals the effective level.23
The relative inefficiency of the output (fuel) tax remains the same because for both the fuel tax and the
emission tax all the terms of the gross efficiency costs are multiplied by the same factor. This factor
does not show up when we look at relative cost ratio.
This is a first attempt to integrate monitoring and enforcement considerations into the choice of policy
instruments in a second-best setting. Much work still needs to be done.
One obvious extension is to include quantity instruments into the calculations. This will involve using
some other assumptions for the expected fine function and this poses new challenges for the numerical
model.
Next also broader monitoring and enforcement policy options need to be considered. Fines can be
replaced by firm closure, imprisonment, … Since these other penalties are costly for society, while a
fine is only a money transfer, the government will have more costs associated with the monitoring and
enforcement strategy. Also the assumptions on the probability of detection function can be altered.
Further it would be useful to take the possibility of measurement errors into account. In reality the
measurement equipment of the inspection agency is not perfectly accurate. This means that there are
false positives and negatives. Some violators are undetected even if they were inspected, while some
innocent firms will be sentenced. So there is a distinction between the probability of inspection and the
probability of detection.
Another possible extension is to distinguish between the probability of detection and the probability of
punishment. In practice we often see that minor violations are left unpunished. This is due to the fact
that convicting a firm is not for free. So it is possible that the judge decides to drop the case because it
is not worth the time and money to follow up. Therefore the firms will make their decisions based on
the probability of punishment and not the probability of detection.
Further extensions can consist of changing the assumptions of the economic model. We could work
with heterogeneous firms per sector. Or we could incorporate heterogeneous consumers and take
distributional aspects into account. Finally we would introduce imperfect compliance for the labour
tax too. This is not unrealistic as the shadow economy counts for 10 to 25% of GDP in Western
economies.24
Appendix 1: Some calculations
Part 1














































































































































































We are interested in the gross effect of the tax increase  E t  on welfare. Differentiating utility
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Appendix 2: The numerical model
The numerical model was written in GAMS.
This is the description of the model when an emission tax is levied.
1. Sets
i = {D, N, L}   - inputs
j = {D, N, CD, CN}  - outputs
k = {leis, C, CD, CN}
2. Parameters
j s elasticity of substitution in production of good j
/D  0.8, N  0.8, CD  0.9, CN  0.9/
c s elasticity of substitution between consumption goods
/0.85/
i b pollution content of good i used
/D  0.062768, N  0, L  0/
e a effectiveness of abatement technology
/0.155/
g curvature parameter for abatement
/0.5/
r t rent taxation rate
/0.4/
L t labour taxation rate
/0.4/
T total time endowment
/2129897.1/
reduc emission reduction
Etotmax maximum amount of emissions possible (in millions of kg)
/23000.028/
ij a distribution parameter for input i in production of good j (via calibration)
k a distribution parameter for the utility function (via calibration)
Fix fixed costs associated with the monitoring and enforcement policy
v variable costs associated with the monitoring and enforcement policy26
3. Variables
ij b use of input i per unit of output of good j
CN CD b b , relative share of consumption of CD and CN respectively to total consumption
CDdem aggregate demand for energy-intensive goods
CNdem aggregate demand for non-energy intensive final goods
ADi aggregate demand for good i
j X aggregate supply of good j
L aggregate labour supply
C  aggregate demand for composite consumption good
leis leisure or non-market time
j p profit per industry j
tot p total profits or total pollution quota rents
j p price of output j
i pr price of input i
C p price of composite good
REV government revenue
e t emission tax
j t tax on output j
G lump-sum transfer
j E actual pollution emitted from production of good j
j Er reported emissions from production of good j
Etot total actual emissions
Ertot total reported emissions
j A abatement expenditure in industry j
U total consumer utility
ij X use of good i in production of good j
j pdet probability of detection per sector j
Fj fine per sector j
r interest rate to be paid on overdue taxes
4. Equations
4.1 Production – firm behaviour
Output
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First-order condition ( j A )
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